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Abstract. In an  earlier paper, I  argued for an  account of the metaphysics of 
grace which was libertarian in nature but also non-Pelagian. My goal in the 
present paper is to broaden my focus on how the human and divine wills relate 
in graced activities. While there is widespread agreement in Christian theology 
that the two do interact in an important way, what’s less clear is how the wills 
of two agents can be united in one of them performing a particular action via 
a kind of joint or unitive willing. Insofar as the goal in these unitive willings 
is to have the human will and the divine will operating together in the human 
bringing about a particular action, I refer to this kind of volition as ‘cooperative 
agency’. I  explore two different models  – an  identificationist model and 
an incarnation model – regarding how the human agent is aligned with God in 
cooperative agency. I then argue that there are significant reasons for preferring 
the incarnational model over the identificationist model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier paper, I argued for an account of the metaphysics of grace 
according to which the following two claims are true:
Claim 1: divine grace is the efficient cause of saving faith, and
Claim 2: humans control whether or not they come to saving faith.1
1 There are, of course, different kinds of grace and what follows will not be relevant to 
all of them. My focus on grace should be restricted to just those cases involving human 
action and excluding, among other things, the grace of creation.
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The motivation for Claim 1 was to avoid running afoul of the anti-
Pelagian constraint (APC), a constraint I think Christian philosophers 
and theologians have good reason to try to satisfy:
(APC): No fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, 
including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a unique 
grace.2
The motivation for Claim 2 was to be able to preserve the compatibility 
of that account with a libertarian account of free will, thereby avoiding 
commitment to theological determinism in the affirmation of Claim 1.
In that paper, I focused on just those acts of will involved in coming 
to saving faith. I confess that I’ve always been somewhat uncomfortable 
with that earlier view given the metaphysical cost it required – namely the 
truth of certain controversial (but, I still think, plausible) claims about 
causation (e.g., that omissions can’t be causes but instead are merely 
quasi-causes). If there’s another account that can preserve both Claim 
1 and Claim 2, I’d welcome it;3 I suspect that what I say in the present 
paper could be joined with such an account as well. But assuming for 
now the model that I developed earlier, my goal is to broaden my focus 
on how the human and divine wills relate in graced activities.4 Rather 
than focusing simply on how the two relate to the act of coming to saving 
faith, I here want to think about the relationship between the human will 
and the divine will more broadly.5 While there is widespread agreement 
in Christian theology that the two do interact in an important way, what’s 
less clear is how the wills of two agents can be united in one of them 
performing a particular action via a kind of joint or unitive willing.
2 For my defence of (APC), see Timpe (2007).
3 For other accounts of how the human will relates to grace, see Stump (2001) and 
Ragland (2006). See Timpe (2007) for why I reject these accounts.
4 The relationship here will be something other than mere concurrence, even though 
this is a minimal condition for the exercise of created agents’ powers: ‘However great 
created functional powers may be, they can do nothing without Divine concurrence .... 
In general concurrence, genuine Divine agency does not compete with genuine created 
agency .... God creates, sustains, and concurs with any created agent whatever.’ (Adams 
2013: 23f.)
5 For instance, the Catechism of the Catholic Church gives the following example: ‘God 
inspired the human authors of the sacred books. “To compose the sacred books, God 
chose certain men who, all the while he employed them in this task, made full use of their 
own faculties and powers so that, though he acted in them and by them, it was as true 
authors that they consigned to writing whatever he wanted written, and no more”.’ (144)
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Insofar as the goal in these unitive willings is to have the human will 
and the divine will operating together in the human bringing about 
a  particular action, I  will refer to this kind of volition as ‘cooperative 
agency’. While there may be many other examples of cooperative agency 
broadly speaking (e.g., a husband and wife willing in tandem regarding 
the raising of their children), my focus here will only address cooperative 
agency regarding humans and God. In addition to satisfying both Claim 
1 and Claim 2 above, I  think any satisfactory account of cooperative 
agency needs to capture a tight connection between the human agent’s 
will and God’s desire for what the human agent should do. Furthermore, 
I  think that the agent should identify with God’s desire in her willing. 
That is, there should not just be a parallel between the divine and the 
human wills, but a genuine alignment (which will be described below in 
terms of identification). It is in virtue of this that a true union will be at 
the heart of cooperative agency.
In what follows I’ll look at two different models – an identificationist 
model and an incarnation model – regarding how the human agent is 
aligned with God in graced willings. It is also important to keep in mind 
that both models are just that  – models, rather than fully spelled out 
positions. Each could itself be developed in a number of more specific 
ways. But at the level of detail that I’ll be able to specify these models 
here, I think there are significant reasons for preferring the incarnational 
model over the identificationist model.
II. IDENTIFICATIONIST MODELS
The first model of cooperative agency is built on identificationist accounts 
of free will, such as that found in the work of Harry Frankfurt. In this 
section, I first outline Frankfurt’s identificationist view of free will. I then 
show how one could model an account of cooperative agency on that 
view. I then argue that while the identificationist account of cooperative 
agency has a number of important positive features, it ultimately fails.
Harry Frankfurt advances an  influential hierarchical account of 
freedom of the will. 6 (Frankfurt’s view is often also called a ‘structuralist’ 
or ‘mesh’ account of the will, since, as detailed below, a  will is free if 
it has a certain internal structure or ‘mesh’ among the various levels of 
6 See Frankfurt (1988), particularly chapter 2.
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desires and volitions.) For Frankfurt, free will (or what Frankfurt calls 
‘freedom of the will’) isn’t simply about a person forming a volition on 
the basis of a desire. Free and responsible agency is not ‘a simple act that 
merely implements a first-order desire. It essentially involves reflexivity, 
including desires and volitions of a  higher order’ (Frankfurt 1988: 
176). According to Frankfurt, ‘the enjoyment of a  free will means the 
satisfaction of certain desires – desires of the second or higher orders’ 
(Frankfurt 1988: 22). Second-order desires are ‘desires concerning what 
first-order desire they want to be their will’ (Frankfurt 1988: 164).7 For 
Frankfurt, just as freedom of action is being able to do what one wants 
to do, freedom of the will is being able to have the kind of will that one 
wants to have. If a  second-order desire moves the agent to act on the 
first-order desire that is the object of that second-order desire, then she 
has a second-order volition. In such a case, Frankfurt writes,
A wants the desire to X to be the desire that moves him effectively to 
act. It is not merely that he wants the desire to X to be among his desires 
by which, to one degree or another, he is moved or inclined to act. He 
wants this desire to be effective – that is, to provide the motive in what 
he actually does. (Frankfurt 1988: 15)
On this view, for example, Allison freely decides to take her dog for a walk 
in the park if she desires to go for a walk with her dog, and she desires 
that the previously mentioned desire be the reason why she actually goes 
for a walk; that is, she identifies with that desire.8 If, on the contrary, the 
desires that lead individuals to act are desires with which the agents do 
not identify, then we are ‘moved to act by something other than what we 
really want’ and ‘moved by a force that is not fully our own’ (Frankfurt 
1988: 164).
Frankfurt’s hierarchical view has been subject to much (and I think 
compelling) criticism.9 For present purposes, the most important is the 
7 As indicated above, Frankfurt also thinks there can be higher-order desires as well.
8 For how Frankfurt understands identification, see, for instance, Stefaan Cuypers: 
‘Frankfurt further describes the formation of second-order volitions in terms of 
identification. A person who desires that a certain desire constitutes his will, identifies 
himself with it; conversely, he withdraws himself from it when he does not desire to be 
motivated by such a desire. There is an important sense in which a desire with which 
a  person identifies himself is more truly his own, whereas a  desire from which he 
withdraws himself is not really his own, although it may still remain part of his ongoing 
stream of consciousness’ (Cuypers 1998: 46).
9 For some of them, see Timpe (2012a), particularly chapter 8.
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idea that desires of a higher order are themselves insufficient to account 
for free will. Susan Wolf, for instance, writes that ‘no matter how many 
levels of self we posit, there will still, in any individual case, be a  last 
level – a deepest self about whom the question “What governs it?” will 
arise, as problematic as ever’ (Wolf 1987: 52). And a similar criticism has 
been raised by Gary Watson.10 Responding to this line of criticism, in 
‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’ Frankfurt writes that
Someone does what he really wants to do only when he acts in 
accordance with a pertinent higher-order volition. But this condition 
could not be sufficient unless the higher-order volition were itself one 
by which the person really wanted to be determined. Now it is pretty 
clear that this requirement cannot be satisfied simply by introducing 
another desire or volition at the next higher level. [...] The mere fact 
that one desire occupies a  higher level than another in the hierarchy 
seems plainly insufficient to endow it with greater authority or with any 
constitutive legitimacy. (Frankfurt 1988: 166)
But if identification is to help avoid the worry that Wolf and Watson raise, 
it must involve more than just higher levels of desire. It is for this purpose 
that Frankfurt introduces the concept of being ‘wholehearted’. The idea 
of being wholehearted about a particular desire aims to illustrate that the 
person is not divided about that desire; that is, there are no higher-level 
conflicts about it.11 Robert Kane nicely captures Frankfurt’s view here as 
follows:
Persons are ‘wholehearted’ when there are no conflicts in their wills 
[at the various levels of desires] and they are not ambivalent about 
what they want to do. Ambivalent persons, by contrast, are of two (or 
more) minds about what they want to do and cannot make up their 
minds. Reflection on our desires stops, says Frankfurt, when we reach 
desires to which we are wholeheartedly committed and to which we 
have no ambivalence. It is not arbitrary, he insists, to identify with 
such wholehearted desires because they are the desires with which we 
10 ‘Since second-order desires are themselves simply desires, to add them to the 
context of a conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give a special 
place to any of those in contention.’ (Watson 1975: 218)
11 Frankfurt thinks there is another kind of division within an  agent’s volitional 
structure – one that involves a conflict between ‘how someone wants to be motivated 
and the desire by which he is in fact most powerfully moved’ (1988: 165) – but this kind 
of division need not concern us at present.
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are ‘fully satisfied’ and we have no ‘active interest’ in bringing about 
a change in them. (Kane 2005: 96f.)
Wholeheartedness, for Frankfurt, does not require the complete absence 
of conflicts among an  agent’s desires. Rather, Frankfurt understands 
that an agent can be wholehearted even if his desires conflict so long as 
he decisively identifies with one of these desires and separates himself 
from the other. Instead, wholeheartedness involves a person endorsing 
a particular desire ‘in the belief that no further accurate inquiry would 
require him to change his mind’ (Frankfurt 1988: 169). The agent is 
‘committed’ to that desire. As a result of this commitment, ‘terminating 
the sequence at that point – the point at which there is no conflict or 
doubt – is not arbitrary.’ (Frankfurt 1988: 169)12 Thus, in answer to Wolf ’s 
question ‘What governs the hierarchy?’, Frankfurt holds that the agent in 
question does in virtue of endorsing wholeheartedly a particular level 
of desire past which there is no more conflict in the agent’s volitional 
structure and past which she thinks no further reflection is necessary.
More could be said about Frankfurt’s view of freedom of the will, 
but the above should be sufficient for developing the first model 
of cooperative agency I  want to explore. Drawing on his account, 
an  identificationist model of cooperative agency can be understood 
along the following lines. An  agent A  wills cooperatively with God 
regarding some action x only if A’s second-order desire is for God’s first-
order desire regarding x. That is, even if A can’t bring herself to have the 
first-order desire to x, she wants God’s desire for her to x to move her 
to action. Merely having such a second-order desire will be insufficient, 
of course, for cooperative willing for the same reasons that merely 
having a second-order desire is insufficient for free will. Building then 
on Frankfurt’s developed view, we might add that cooperative agency 
requires not just the second-order desire for God’s desire to become the 
agent’s will, but also that the agent wholeheartedly identify with that 
desire. To put it schematically, we can say:
Identificationist Cooperative Agency:
Agent A  and God are engaged in cooperative agency regarding some 
action x if and only if:
12 Here, Frankfurt notes the etymological root of ‘to decide’ as ‘to cut off ’: ‘This is apt, 
since it is characteristically by a decision [...] that a sequence of desires or preferences of 
increasingly higher orders is terminated. When the decision is made without reservation, 
the commitment it entails is decisive.’ (Frankfurt 1988: 170)
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(i) God desires A to do x;
(ii) A has a second-order desire, D, for God’s desire for her to do x to 
become her volition;
(iii) A identifies with D;
(iv) A is wholehearted regarding D; and
(v) A subsequently forms a volition to x as a result of her whole-
hearted identification with D.
Using Frankfurt’s terminology, we can also say that because of (v), the 
second-order desire in (ii) becomes the agent’s second-order volition. 
And, in light of (iii) and (iv), this is a second-order volition with which 
the agent wholeheartedly identifies. Let me give an  example here to 
illustrate. First, suppose that Emmaline has $20. She desires to spend 
it on something for herself that, while she would enjoy it, she does not 
need. She also knows that God desires His people to engage in acts of 
charity, say by giving the money to Oxfam. She wants her volition to 
be in line with God’s desire, even if she also has a conflicting first-order 
desire to spend the money on herself. She has no further higher-order 
desires which conflict with her second-order desire for God’s desire to 
become her will. That is, she wholeheartedly identifies with God’s desire 
to give her money to charity. As a result of her identifying wholeheartedly 
with God’s desire in this way, she forms the volition to give the money to 
Oxfam, cooperatively acting with God to bring about an act of charity.
I  think this model gets a  number of things correct regarding 
cooperative agency. For one, I  think it’s right that the agent identifies 
in an important sense with God’s desire for her.13 Second, I  think that 
identification needs to play an explanatory role in why the agent does the 
action in question; this explanatory role is captured by (v) in the above 
schema. Furthermore, in virtue of this explanatory role, the individual is 
united with God’s will in an important way – the agent is making God’s 
desire be her will.14
Despite thinking that the identificationist model is right in these 
regards, I think that ultimately it fails as an analysis of cooperative agency 
when we look at an example of the volition involved in coming to faith. 
13 See Stump (forthcoming) for an excellent account of how an agent’s identifying and 
aligning herself with God will lead to psychic integration.
14 This point is inspired by a  comment by Alex Pruss: ‘When one participates in 
a popular devotion because it is popular, one is thereby united in will with the community 
in which the devotion was popular.’
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In particular, I think the conditions outlined above are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to explain an agent’s act of coming to saving faith.
To see why these conditions are not sufficient, consider the case for 
Magdalen’s conversion, that is, going from status corruptionis  to status 
gratiae.15 Creatures in the status corruptionis suffer from a  ‘spiritual 
illness of the post-Fall human condition’.16 While being in this state 
affects many  – perhaps even all  – aspects of human nature, ‘the 
foundational defect is in the will. One hallmark of this defect is the 
will’s internal fragmentation, its intractability to itself, its proneness to 
moral wrong even against its own desires for the good.’17 According to 
Christian theology, given this defect in the will an agent is not able to be 
the efficient cause of her moving from the status corruptionis to status 
gratiae. This is why, in his writings against Pelagius and his disciples, 
Augustine repeatedly emphasizes that ‘cooperative grace’ or what 
Augustine calls ‘a unique grace’18 is needed.19 Similarly, Aquinas writes 
that ‘a man cannot perform meritorious deeds without grace’.20 And the 
Council of Trent declares that ‘the efficient cause [of our justification 
is] the God of mercy who, of his own free will, washes and sanctifies, 
placing his seal and anointing with the promised holy Spirit who is the 
guarantee of our inheritance’.21 These sorts of considerations are what 
motivates (APC). So Magdalen is not able to form the first-order volition 
to come to saving faith on her own. The identificationist model aims 
at getting around this by making the effective first-order desire God’s 
desire, with which the agent identifies with at a higher order.22 But here 
15 For more on the role these two states play in philosophical anthropology, see Timpe 
(2014), chapter 1 and Timpe & Jenson (2015).
16 Stump (forthcoming), p. 1 in draft.
17 Stump (forthcoming), p. 1 in draft.
18 See for example Augustine’s On Nature and Grace in (1992), Saint Augustine: Four 
Anti-Pelagian Writings, 69.
19 For why I  think Pelagius’ view is often misunderstood on this point, see Timpe 
(2007).
20 Aquinas, Truth, 24.1 ad 2 in Schmidt, ed. (1954: 139).
21 Council of Trent, Sixth Session, Chapter VII, as quoted in Tanner (1990: 673). Also 
note that efficient causation is the only kind of causation that I am concerned with in the 
present paper.
22 Maximus the Confessor writes that, in the Garden of Gethsemane, the human 
will is subjected to the divine will: ‘Earlier reflection on the Agony in the Garden had 
interpreted this in terms of the human submission of the Incarnate Will to the divine 
will: in making explicit that this must involve the submission of a  human will to the 
divine will Maximus was breaking new ground’ (Louthe 1996: 58). I  want to suggest 
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the identificationist model of cooperative agency faces a dilemma. Either 
the agent is the efficient cause of her coming to faith, or she’s not. On 
either horn, the initial constraints of a satisfactory account of cooperative 
agency are violated.
Consider first that the agent is the efficient cause of her second-order 
volition to make God’s desire her will. In such a case, (APC) is violated, 
not at the level of first-order volitions, but instead at the second-order of 
volition.23 For willing that God’s desire becomes one’s will is itself to will 
the good, since one’s alignment with God’s desires is a good thing. And 
according to (APC), no human in the status corruptionis is able to cause 
or will any good apart from a unique grace.
Consider then the second horn of the dilemma. On this horn, it is not 
the agent herself that is the cause of her second-order volition for coming 
to saving faith. Given that we’re talking about cooperative agency between 
human agents and God, the natural alternative explanation is that God 
is the efficient cause of the volition in question. Were Frankfurt himself 
a theist, I think that this is the horn of the dilemma he’d prefer – that is, 
that God can cause the agent to have the required second-order volition 
to come to saving faith. Frankfurt candidly admits that he only cares 
about the internal relationships within an agent’s volitional structure, not 
how her volitional structure got to be the way it is; so presumably he’d say 
that the relevant volition could be caused directly by God:
The only thing that really counts is what condition I am in. How I got 
into that condition is another matter. If I’m in the condition where I’m 
doing what I want to do and I really want to do it, i.e., I decisively identify 
with my action, then I think I’m responsible for it. It makes no difference 
how it came about that that is the case. [...] If the person is wholehearted 
in the action, let us say performs the action because he wants to perform 
it and the desire to perform it is a  desire that he really wants to have 
and there’s no reservation, there’s no imposition, no passivity: the person 
is completely, fully, wholeheartedly identified with what’s going on. 
What more could there be? What more could you want? That’s all the 
freedom that’s possible for human beings to have, in my opinion. [...]
that something similar happens in cooperative agency, and I think that this can best be 
accounted for by the incarnational model below.
23 See also Stump (forthcoming), footnote 1. It wouldn’t resolve the problem here to 
push the issue up to the third-order level or higher, for reasons related to Wolf ’s criticism 
of Frankfurt’s view above.
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What accounts for the fact that he’s completely wholehearted is no longer 
relevant. The only important consideration is that he is doing exactly 
what he wants to do and he’s totally satisfied with doing this. (Frankfurt 
1988: 32ff.)24
And in another article, Frankfurt writes that ‘the degree to which his 
choice is autonomous and the degree to which he acts freely do not 
depend on the origin of the conditions which lead him to choose and to 
act as he does’ (Frankfurt 1988: 46).
This might be an  option for the compatibilist, though not all 
compatibilists find such a  view plausible. Al Mele, for instance, finds 
this aspect of Frankfurt’s view ‘difficult to accept’ (Mele 2008: 270)25 
despite being sympathetic with much of the rest of it, insofar as Mele 
thinks that such direct manipulation would undermine free will. But it’s 
especially hard to see how an incompatibilist could accept this horn of 
the dilemma. For starters, incompatibilists think there are problems with 
Frankfurt’s hierarchical analysis of freedom of the will.26 As an account 
of cooperative agency and not free will in general, this view also conflicts 
with Claim 2, which is itself motivated by incompatibilist concerns: 
humans control whether or not they come to saving faith.
So no matter which horn of the dilemma one takes, I think we have 
good reason for rejecting the identificationist model of cooperative 
agency as sufficient for cooperative agency. But I also think we have reason 
to think that it isn’t necessary either. Criterion (iv) requires the agent 
to be wholehearted regarding her second-order desire for God’s desire 
for her salvation to become her will. And while I don’t want to rule out 
that religious conversations can be wholehearted in this way, and I think 
that ultimate perfect union with God would be wholehearted in this way, 
I don’t see why coming to saving faith would require it. Remember from 
above that as Frankfurt understands wholeheartedness, it can involve 
conflict among an agent’s desires so long as the agent identifies decisively 
with one of them and separates herself from the other. In this context 
Frankfurt writes that
24 In ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’ Frankfurt also criticizes Aristotle’s account 
of responsibility given its ‘preoccupation with causal origins and causal responsibility’ 
(1988: 171).
25 See also McKenna (2011) for a worthwhile discussion of Frankfurt’s view on this 
point.
26 See footnote 9 above.
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When someone identifies himself with one rather than another of his 
own desires, the result is not necessarily to eliminate the conflict between 
those desires, or even to reduce is severity, but to alter its nature. [...] 
The conflict between the desires is in this way transformed into a conflict 
between one of them and the person who has identified with its rival. 
That person is no longer uncertain which side he is on, in the conflict 
between the two desires, and the persistence of this conflict need not 
subvert or diminish the wholeheartedness of his commitment to the 
desire with which he identifies. (Frankfurt 1988: 172)
But surely those who are united to God in faith can be conflicted not 
just between a  desire and the self but rather within the self. Thus, by 
extension, it seems that people could also be conflicted in the act of 
coming to faith. Paul, for instance, writes that he does not do the good 
that he wants, but instead the evil that he does not want (Romans 7:19). 
Surely there is a sense in which Paul wants (and thus sees as good) the 
evil in question; so I think we should interpret Paul as making a second-
order claim here. And so it seems that Paul is indeed ‘uncertain which 
side he is on’.27
While I’m less certain about this claim that the identificationist 
criteria are not necessary for cooperative agency, even if they merely 
aren’t sufficient, I think the identificationist model should be rejected as 
an account of the very nature of cooperative agency.
III. INCARNATIONAL MODEL
The other model, and the one that I think is ultimately more promising, 
understands cooperative agency between humans and God along 
the lines of how the divine and human wills relate to each other in 
the Incarnation. For this reason, I shall refer to it as the incarnational 
model. Before I  can get to the model, however, I  have to address the 
norms governing one’s reflection on the Incarnation. Following Scott 
MacDonald, my methodology in approaching such topics is what he 
calls ‘clarification’. The philosophical theologian engaged in clarification
can legitimately undertake the investigation of not only the question 
of God’s existence and attributes  – issues associated with traditional 
27 I  think a  similar claim could be made regarding Augustine in the Confessions 
shortly after his conversion.
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natural theology  – but also doctrines such as trinity, incarnation, and 
atonement – traditional paradigms of doctrines inaccessible to natural 
reason. When the philosopher takes up these kinds of issues with 
the aim of articulating and developing them, probing their internal 
coherence, joint consistency, and systematic connections, and exploring 
their relations to other theological and nontheological doctrines, she 
will be engaged in appropriately philosophical reflection on specifically 
Christian theological matters. (MacDonald 2009: 23)
In light of this methodology, I  have certain constraints that I  take to 
govern what is acceptable to say regarding the Incarnation, even if I do 
not defend the normativity of those constraints here. I’m going to take 
as my primary guiding constraint the Christology found in the earliest 
seven Ecumenical Councils  – the Councils held as binding by both 
Catholic and Orthodox Christians.28 More specifically, what I  have in 
mind is what Oliver Crisp calls ‘dogmatic minimalism’. Speaking of the 
Chalcedonian definition, which he takes to be a good example of this 
sort of theological approach that he’s advocating, Crisp writes that ‘it is 
minimalistic because the definition says as little as doctrinally possible 
about the hypostatic union, while making clear that certain ways of 
thinking about the person of Christ are off-limits, or unorthodox’ (Crisp 
2013: 27).29
28 As Sturch (1991) argues, the primary purpose of the early councils was not to 
establish a  single orthodox position, but to rule out positions that are not orthodox 
(1991: 214). Similarly, Crisp (2013) writes that ‘if we bear in mind that the dogmatic 
hardcore of classical Christology is rather thin, and deliberately so, it should help us to 
see that there may be many different Christologies that are consistent with the canons of 
Chalcedon’ (2013: 28).
29 Relatedly, Crisp writes: ‘God would not permit the church to come to a substantially 
mistaken account of the person of Christ and to encode this in a  canonical decision 
in an ecumenical doctrine, for what we think about the person of Christ touches the 
heart of Christian doctrine, and therefore the heart of the gospel. It is an impoverished 
doctrine of providence that claims otherwise.’ (2013: 24)
Crisp’s dogmatic minimalism is a weaker claim than Tim Pawl’s ‘Conciliar Christology,’ 
which refers to the conjunction of the teachings from the earliest seven Ecumenical 
Councils. ‘The conjuncts of this conjunction come from definitions and expositions 
of faith, creeds, canons, and anathemas of the councils. If such conciliar statements 
include other documents [...] then I will include the Christological teachings from those 
documents as conjuncts of Conciliar Christology, too’ (Pawl, in progress), chapter 1, p. 2 
in draft). While I am inclined to strive to meet compatibility with Conciliar Christology, 
for purposes of expediency I’ll restrict myself to Crisp’s dogmatic minimalism.
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There are, of course, complicated questions in the vicinity regarding the 
exact boundaries of Christological orthodoxy. But I don’t think I need to 
demarcate them further for my present purposes. It is clear that dogmatic 
minimalism includes the following from Third Constantinople, which 
canonized dyothelitism, the claim that Christ has two wills:
[W]e proclaim equally two natural volitions or wills in him and two 
natural principles of action which undergo division, no change, no 
partition, no confusion, in accordance with the teaching of the holy 
fathers. And the two natural wills not in opposition, as the impious 
heretics said, far from it, but his human will following, and not resisting 
and struggling, rather in fact subject to his divine and all powerful will. 
For the will of the flesh had to be moved, and yet to be subjected to the 
divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius. For just as his flesh 
is said to be and is flesh of the Word of God, so too the natural will of 
his flesh is said to and does belong to the Word of God. [...] For in the 
same way that his all holy and blameless animate flesh was not destroyed 
in being made divine but remained in its own limit and category, so his 
human will as well was not destroyed by being made divine, but rather 
was preserved.30
And regarding the two wills in the Incarnation, Cyril of Alexandria 
writes (in a  letter that Chalcedon would latter accept as authoritative) 
that in Christ ‘two different natures come together to form a unity’.31
Drawing on earlier work by Garrett DeWeese, Crisp affirms an axiom 
that he calls the Chalcedonian Axiom (CA):
(CA) Christ has one of whatever goes with the person and two of 
whatever goes with natures.32
30 In Tanner (1990: 128). Though not an ecumenical council, the Lateran Council in 
649 asserted the following:
Canon 10: ‘If anyone does not properly and truly confess according to the holy Fathers 
two wills of and the same Christ our God, united uninterruptedly, divine and human, 
and on this account that through each of His natures the same one of His own free will is 
the operator of our salvation, let him be condemned.’ (Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic 
Dogma, para. 263; as quoted in Pawl (2014: 236)).
31 As quoted in Pawl (in progress: chapter 1, p. 5). The Second Council of Nicea would 
later ‘declare that there are two wills and principles of action, in accordance with what is 
proper to each of the natures of Christ’.
32 Crisp (2013: 32); DeWeese (2007: 115). One can find an  affinity, it seems to 
me, between what Crisp and DeWeese are advocating and the doctrine of ‘double 
consubstantiality’.
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And insofar as each nature has a will, Christ must have, via (CA), two 
wills.33 When Chalcedon speaks of ‘two principles of action’ it means 
‘two things by which action can come’, referring to the two natures. 
When these two principles of action align in a particular action, there 
are not two actions but one – one action of the one person who has two 
natures. We can speak, in this one person, of the divine will being united 
to a created will as God being united with a human agent – after all, this is 
how Aquinas speaks of the human soul: ‘We do not call Christ a creature, 
speaking absolutely, since his name signifies the hypostasis. But we say 
that Christ’s soul or body is a creature.’ (Aquinas 2009: 172) While there 
may be two wills willing an action, there are not therefore two actions.34 
So in the Incarnation we have two wills united in such a way as to produce 
one singular action. Jesus Christ ‘goes up’ to Jerusalem in virtue of both 
His human nature and divine nature willing His body to so walk. And 
this, I shall argue, provides a way of understanding how human wills and 
divine wills align in cooperative agency. When Emmaline gives her $20 
to Oxfam, this one act of charity is accomplished by her uniting her will 
with God’s will in a single act.
At this point, I  think it will be helpful to pause to address a worry 
that may arise. The worry can be understood in two ways, one of which 
I think can be dispatched with pretty easily. The second version of the 
worry will lead to the need to be explicit about two disanalogies between 
the Incarnation and cooperative agency more generally. My discussion 
of the second disanalogy will then lead to further development of the 
Incarnational Model.
The worry is about the attempt to use the Incarnation to elucidate 
and explain cooperative agency. This worry might be understood in two 
ways. The stronger way of understanding the worry is that reflection on 
the relationship between the human will and nature, on the one hand, 
and the divine will and nature on the other is misplaced. After all, Cyril 
describes the hypostatic union of the two natures as an ‘ineffable union’ 
(Tanner 1990: 41, 72) and Second Constantinople declares as anathema 
33 Louth (1996) refers to the doctrine of two wills in the Incarnation as ‘an entailment 
of the doctrine of the two natures’ (1996: 17). The Council of Chalcedon in 451 affirmed 
that the Incarnate Christ has ‘two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no 
division, no separation; at no point was the difference between the natures taken away 
through the union, but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes 
together into a single person and a single subsistent being.’
34 See also Stump (2003: 447ff.).
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anyone who does not ‘confess a belief in our one Lord, understood in 
both his divinity and his humanity, so as by this to signify a difference of 
natures of which an ineffable union has been made’ (Tanner 1990: 117).35 
The worry about ineffability here can be seen as a demanding version of 
negative theology that eschews all positive claims about the divine nature. 
I don’t see the strong version of the ineffability worry as a genuine worry. 
After all, the reflection that the early ecumenical councils engaged in not 
only made claims about the divine nature and hypostatic union, but this 
was in fact the point.36
The weaker way of understanding the worry, one that I have some 
sympathy with, is that even if speaking of the relationship between the 
two natures in the Incarnation isn’t inappropriate because ineffable, 
we’re attempting to understand something more common (namely, 
cooperative agency in general) via something considerably less common, 
indeed singular (namely, the Incarnation). As mentioned above, I have 
some sympathy with this way of understanding the worry. But here’s why 
I don’t think the worry undermines the present project. Christians are 
already committed to the interaction of the two wills in the Incarnation. 
Indeed, as pointed out earlier, it’s a requirement of dogmatic minimalism. 
As I’ve argued elsewhere regarding free will, even if we are more familiar 
with human freedom than we are divine freedom, there is still reason 
to think that the latter is the primary sense of free will.37 And so, given 
commitment to dyothelitism, I  don’t think it inappropriate to use 
the relationship between the two wills as a  model for understanding 
35 Maximus the Confessor, whose view I  reference below, also referred to the 
hypostatic union as ‘the great mystery’ (Louth 1996: 55).
36 For more on this, see Pawl (forthcoming: chapter 1).
37 In Timpe (2012b), I wrote the following: ‘To use a common example from Christian 
theology, the meaning of the predicate involved in saying “God is a loving father” is not 
univocal with the meaning of the predicate involved in saying “Brent is a loving father”. 
But neither are the two meanings completely equivocal, for presumably what it means 
for God to be a loving father bears a significant relationship to what it means for Brent to 
be a loving father. Saying what exactly this relationship is is at the heart of an analogical 
approach to religious language. Analogical predication can be approached either through 
the order of being or the order of knowing. So, to return to our example, what it means 
for Brent to be a loving father is grounded in, or dependent upon, what it means for God 
to be a loving father. The order of being is thus grounded in God. But epistemically, we 
first become aware of what it means to be a loving father through humans such as Brent 
and then later come to realize what it means for God to be a loving father. This is the 
order of knowing.’ (Timpe 2012b: 89)
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cooperative agency more generally. But it is exactly at this point that the 
two disanalogies must be addressed.
The first disanalogy is this: the union in the Incarnation is the union 
of two wills (and two complete natures more fully) into one person – it is 
a hypostatic union. ‘There is one person in Christ. So there is one subject 
of predication, one fundamental entity to which we refer when we 
speak of Christ. But this person has two complete, unconfused natures.’ 
(Crisp 2013: 32) While our cooperation with God unites us with God 
in an important sense, we neither become the same person as God nor 
have our personhood taken up into the divine person in the sense that 
our personhood becomes a part of the three persons that are the Divine 
Nature. So far as I can tell, nothing of importance for the incarnational 
model of cooperative agency hangs on this disanalogy.38
The second disanalogy will require a more lengthy response. In the 
case of the Incarnation, the human will that was engaged in cooperative 
agency with the divine will was untainted by sin, original or actual. The 
two wills were always, as a matter of fact, aligned with each other.39 But 
this is not so of normal cases of cooperative agency: other human wills 
38 There is a  tradition in parts of Christianity that appears to endorse that we can 
approach such a hypostatic union. Maximus the Confessor was shaped by Evagrius, who 
held that ‘we can attain equality with Christ, become isochristoi’ (Louth 1996: 24). While 
I find this a fascinating suggestion and think that the Eastern Church’s understanding of 
deification may also lead in this direction, I will not pursue this option in greater detail 
here. See also pages 34f., as well as Opuscules 3 and 7 reprinted therein for Maximus on 
deification. I think that the connections between Maximus’ understanding of deification 
and the above treatment of cooperative agency are deserving of further attention. And 
compare Adams’s discussion of Peter Lombard’s view of the hypostatic union between 
the Holy Spirit and the human will in Adams (2013: 28f.).
39 I’m inclined to think that it is only a  contingent truth that the human will and 
the divine will in the Incarnation were always aligned. So far as I can tell, both this and 
the stronger claim that they were necessarily aligned are within the bounds of dogmatic 
minimalism. In personal correspondence, Tim Pawl has suggested the following middle 
position between the two above options: ‘My view is that Christ’s human nature [CHN] 
was not essentially morally perfect, but the person of Christ is impeccable. CHN is 
not essentially morally perfect because, on my view, it could have existed but not been 
assumed. In such a case, it would fulfill the conditions for being a supposit, and so also 
for being a person. That person, call him Walter, would not have been essentially morally 
perfect. He could sin. And so CHN is not essentially morally perfect. If that sounds 
scandalous, we can note that it is something in the neighborhood of essentially morally 
perfect. It – and any nature that is assumable – is such that, necessarily (if it is assumed, 
then it is unable to sin in that circumstance).’ See also Stump (2003: 417f.).
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fail to be aligned with the divine will.40 And so we need an account of 
what happens with the wills which do not align in such a case.
The matrix for understanding the possibilities here is going to be 
complex: there are a  number of different moral valences for what is 
being willed (morally good, morally bad, morally neutral); two wills; 
three ‘settings’ for a particular will (willing x, willing ~x, being quiescent 
regarding x); as well as two different stages of theological anthropology 
that need to be incorporated: the status corruptionis  and the status 
gratiae. I’m going to narrow down the options in ways that I think are 
well motivated.
The first way to narrow down the possible permutations is by 
eliminating all those options according to which God wills against 
what is morally good. Given essential moral perfection, I don’t see it as 
an option for God to will in such a way. I’m also going to, for purposes of 
simplicity, eliminate those options where what is being willed is morally 
neutral.41 Also, given essential moral perfection, I take it that God would 
never be quiescent regarding a good.42 This leaves the following options, 
where x is an all-things-considered good option:
(A) a corrupt human will wills x and God wills x43
(B) a corrupt human will is quiescent regarding x and God wills x
(C) a corrupt human will wills ~x and God wills x
(D) a graced human will wills x and God wills x44
(E) a graced human will is quiescent regarding x and God wills x
(F) a graced human will wills ~x and God wills x.
(APC) rules out possibility (A), and so I will not consider it further.
First, I want to consider the two options where the human will wills 
in opposition to the divine will, options (C) and (F). In these cases, the 
40 Depending on one’s theological views, Mary may be another counterexample to the 
claim that human wills fail to be aligned with God’s will.
41 Those instances that involve an agent coming to have saving faith won’t be morally 
neutral. Whether or not one thinks that a redeemed human can engage in cooperative 
agency towards something that is morally neutral in other cases will depend on other 
aspects of one’s theology.
42 I mean something that is pro toto good, not just pro tanto good. See Wiland (2012) 
for the difference between pro toto and pro tanto.
43 Here and in (B) and (C), by ‘corrupt human will’ I mean the will of a human who 
is in the status corruptionis.
44 Here and in (E) and (F), by ‘graced human will’ I mean the will of a human who is 
in the status gratiae.
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human willing wins out and the agent fails to do x freely. (I presume that 
God can determine an agent to do x, even if He cannot determine the 
agent to freely do x. But in such a case, we’re talking coercion rather than 
cooperative agency.) So in cases involving contrary wills regarding the 
relevant human free action, the human will trumps the divine will. On 
the assumption of incompatibilism, God cannot make a human freely do 
x by an act of His will.
Consider then option (B). This is the kind of example I had in mind in 
my earlier paper on grace. That view gives the correct output – if an agent 
is quiescent regarding x and God wills x, then God can bring about x – 
while it is also the case that the human agent controls (in the relevant 
sense of ‘control’ spelled out there) x. But in general I don’t think this 
control is sufficient for our cooperating with God’s volition in the sense at 
issue in the present paper. What we don’t have yet, however, is an account 
of how the two agents are cooperative in bringing about x since the human 
agent isn’t willing it (even if she’s not actively resisting it).
Here, I  think some suggestions regarding joint intentions by David 
Velleman might be useful. In a paper on shared intentions, Velleman’s 
goal is to given an account of ‘a plural subject that isn’t just a plurality 
of subjects. That is, it ought to involve two or more subjects who 
combine in such a way as to constitute one subject, just as two or more 
referents combine to constitute one referent when subsumed under 
a  plural pronoun’ (Velleman 1997: 30).45 And while Velleman talks 
about intentions rather than acts of willing, he understands them as 
what ‘resolve[s] deliberative questions, thereby settling issues that are 
up to you’ (Velleman 1997: 32).46 He also talks about intentions as what 
can ‘cause action’, and thus a  joint intention (in his sense of the term) 
can I  think plausibly be understood as a  volition. Similarly, his goal 
isn’t to give an account of how two or more people can share the goal 
of producing a particular joint result (he gives the example here of two 
people deciding to lift a  heavy sofa together), but rather it’s being up 
45 What Velleman is trying to avoid is having ‘a  plural subject as a  mere façon de 
parler, a convenient way of summarizing facts about a collection of subjects who never 
actually meld’ (1997: 31). There are other aspects of Velleman’s account that I  find 
problematic, such as his apparent conflation of a reason and an  intention (the former 
might be necessary for the latter, but it’s not sufficient; see 39f.). But these problems need 
not concern us at present.
46 Granted, he takes intentions to be attitudes, but this feature of his view is detachable 
from the rest of his account for my present purposes.
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to the two or more individuals whether or not a single joint intention 
or volition is formed. Velleman suggests that two agents might form 
a single intention to x by each having an intention of the following sort: 
‘I will [x] if you will’ so long as such an intention is understood in the 
following way:
It means, ‘I  hereby frame an  effective intention that’s conditional on 
your framing an  effective intention as well’  – that is, ‘I  hereby will it, 
conditional on your willing likewise.’ And this statement just is the 
conditional willing that it describes itself as being. (Velleman 1997: 45)
Now, obviously this account by itself would not serve as a  complete 
explanation of option (B). But perhaps we can modify it as follows, 
incorporating an insight from the hierarchical model examined earlier. 
In the hope of making this clearer, I’ll frame it regarding a  particular 
agent (Magdalen) willing a particular thing (x), but hopefully the way to 
schematize it will be relatively obvious:
In option (B), Magdalen is unable (given (APC)) to will x. She is, instead, 
quiescent regarding x. But suppose that her will includes the following 
higher-order intention: ‘I will accept God’s volition regarding x so long 
as I don’t will against it.’ That is, if God wills me to x, I have the higher-
order desire to let God’s desire become my volition.
Now, note that this is a  conditional desire, and not an  actual desire 
(and thus not an actual volition in Frankfurt’s sense). It is possible to 
have such a desire for a good without having, simpliciter, a good desire. 
In forming such a conditional desire, the agent is aligning with God’s 
volition via the higher order desire in question (e.g., ‘I will accept God’s 
volition regarding x so long as I don’t will against it’).47 But there’s more 
here than just mere alignment insofar as the agent’s will plays a crucial 
and irreducible role (namely, that she doesn’t will against God’s will). 
Both the agent and God thus are working together to bring about 
a  single volition in the agent, thereby genuinely cooperating. Hence, 
cooperative agency. And this account of (B) is explicitly constructed to 
avoid violating (APC). Thus, I see nothing problematic in such a view.48
47 This is one reason that, despite my earlier arguments, I think that the identificationist 
model gets something importantly right.
48 Robert Garcia, in personal correspondence, has asked if the schema would allow 
for the agent to be quiescent in the higher-order intention, such that the agent would 
accept God’s volition regarding x if she was merely quiescent regarding accepting God’s 
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Now, if this is an  acceptable account of (B), it can also serve as 
an acceptable account of (E). The difference between the two was that 
on (B) the agent lacked the further grace that Augustine and Pelagius 
disagreed about. We don’t have to worry about the uniquely graced agent 
violating (APC), for reasons addressed in my earlier paper. And if God 
can cooperate with an ungraced (in the relevant sense) agent as spelled 
out above regarding (B) to bring about x, then surely God can cooperate 
with a graced agent in the same way to bring about x.
Finally, option (D). Here too I’ll begin with a  conditional: if the 
account here can give an  account of (B), then the account can also 
give an  account of (D). Why think this conditional is true? Well, in 
the discussion of (E) I argued that the addition of the unique grace to 
the agent’s will makes the account easier, not harder, since the Pelagian 
(and semi-Pelagian) worry is now off the table. Similarly, if an  agent 
can engage in cooperative agency with God via her quiescence, then 
surely her actually willing what God wills (rather than not resisting it 
and being willing to endorse God’s willing at a higher-level of volition) 
doesn’t make that cooperative agency more difficult. On this option, the 
agent’s will and the divine will are engaged in a joint volition. And I’ve 
suggested that Velleman’s account of this might be a (though certainly 
not the only) way that this might work. In willing what God wills, the 
agent is ‘forming an effective intention to x that’s conditional on God’s 
forming an intention for the agent to x as well and thereby conditionally 
willing x on God’s willing x likewise’. Both wills are united to bring about 
a single volition for the agent to x.
IV. CONCLUSION
I  think that such an  account is not only a  plausible reconstruction of 
what happens regarding the two wills of Christ in the Incarnation, but 
volition regarding x. I confess that I’m not completely sure what I should say about such 
a  case, though I’m inclined to think that mere quiescence, rather than acceptance at 
some level, would not be sufficiently strong to unite the agent’s will with God’s volition 
in the relevant way. On the other hand, given my thoughts about God’s essential loving 
nature, I also think that God would give all agents the benefit of the doubt, and this gives 
me some reason to think that higher-level quiescence rather than acceptance might be 
enough. After all, I’m inclined to think that God will redeem those who, despite suffering 
from original sin, are not able to wilfully reject God (because of young age, impairment, 
or other limitation).
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also gives an account of how we humans can participate with God – in 
a  very real sense  – in bringing about His Kingdom, both in our own 
wills and also in the larger world. It also gives an account of cooperative 
agency that gets right those features that the identificationist model gets 
right, but provides a better way of reconciling a union between the divine 
and human wills in a way that preserves incompatibilism while also not 
violating the (APC). On this model, cooperative agency is truly a form of 
unitive agency, since the grace at the heart of the account aims at uniting 
us with God. We come to will and love what God wills and loves, not just 
alongside Him but united with Him. And especially for the Christian 
libertarian, this is a robust and cooperative sense of divine action in the 
world that I think we have positive reason to endorse.49
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